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In LibertarianPaternalism,Path Dependence, and Temporary
Law, Professors Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard
H. McAdams (GMM) present an attractive theory of "temporary
law" as law that expires after a set period of time.' Their theory
builds a persuasive normative case that in limited circumstances, temporary law might usefully dislodge a preexisting
equilibrium. Like the archaic Alka-Seltzer ads, there may be
times when a legally induced "try it, you'll like it" strategy
produces a superior, new separating equilibrium.2
Their simple smoking model raises profound questions
about how libertarians should react to the possibility of multiple
equilibria and to government-dislodging actions that merely
move private choice from one equilibrium to another. 3 While
they characterize learning as one of the principle benefits of
temporarily forcing individuals to take alternative actions,4 their
model might generate multiple equilibria even in a world of perfect information-in which each actor knows of the existence of
alternative equilibria but has no individual incentive to move
toward them.
Their article also succeeds in creating a new category of
regulation that helps organize a variety of existing practices,
from the Supreme Court's mandated twenty-five-year sunset for
affirmative action to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's bank
holidays.5 Indeed, it is easy to conjure additional examples.
There is much more that could be said about sunset laws as premeditated temporary law.6 And while GMM mention temporary
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curfews, police COMPSTAT-based choices to temporarily flood
particular neighborhoods with officers are also related.' After
reading their article, I could imagine the possible utility of temporarily decertifying unions or temporarily unionizing unorganized
employees. Their article might even rationalize parents calling
for temporary breakups to see if a teen relationship was meant
to last. My employer requires that my computer passwords are
only temporary and my human subject approvals all have expiration dates. It would be useful to try to join these examples into
an even more general theory of the temporary (or the durable).
In this Essay, I will suggest additional ways that the law
might temporarily dislodge the ex ante equilibrium, and I will
also suggest additional ways that the law might regulate the
world ex post the temporary dislodgement.
I. DISLODGING ALTERNATIVES
GMM's motivating examples are about temporary restrictions
on liberty (followed by a return to liberty) 8 In these examples, the
laissez-faire behavior is temporarily dislodged by perfectly enforced
restrictions that mandate that private actors do or refrain from
doing certain things. But while mandatory restrictions and duties
enforced by property rules will usually be sufficient to dislodge
an ex ante equilibrium,9 there may be a variety of other temporary dislodging interventions. It might, for example, be possible
to dislodge a preexisting equilibrium by imposing a duty that
can be avoided by payment of a liability-rule-like amount or by
limiting the right to do something unless a payment is made.
Indeed, GMM's example of traffic-congestion pricing represents
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this kind of a liability rule.1o And the law might temporarily deploy financial carrots as well as liability-rule sticks to bring
about the benefits of changed behavior." The law might also
perturb an initial equilibrium with judicious use of default and
altering rules.12 An immediate implication of GMM's approach is
that temporary penalty default rules might be sufficient to force
the revelation of information without incurring the long-term
transaction costs of forcing all contractors to contract around a
permanent default rule. These softer dislodging mechanisms
might impose less of a burden on private liberty and, relatedly,
might provide more opportunities for political compromise. Indeed,
even softer interventions, such as the government just asking,
rather than imposing a law, might be sufficient to dislodge a
preexisting equilibrium. Informally or formally bestowing some
sort of honor on homeowners who alter their lawn watering
behavior during a water shortage, for example, might be sufficient to change behavior in the long run.13
II. Ex POST ALTERNATIVES
Many of GMM's examples contemplate a world in which
law reverts to a laissez-faire norm after the temporary period
of restriction. But just as there are softer alternatives to the
hard-edged dislodging strategies during the period of restriction,
the law might produce a range of firmer ex post restriction regulations. For example, after a period of prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the law might
transition to an opt-out regime in which employer nondiscrimination is presumed unless employers contracted around the default by publically announcing their desire to retain the right to
discriminate on that basis.14 Lawmakers could impact the

1o See id at 353-55 (cited in note 1). See also generally Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky, PliabilityRules, 101 Mich L Rev 1 (2002).
11 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2014),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2351358 (visited July 19, 2014).
12
See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121
Yale L J 2032, 2036 (2012) (explaining altering rules as "rules that govern how one contracts
around the default").
13 This would be in contrast to command-and-control methods like those outlined in
Douglas S. Kenney, Roberta A. Klein, and Martyn P. Clark, Use and Effectiveness of Municipal Water Restrictions duringDrought in Colorado,40 J Am Water Res Assoc 77 (2004).
14 See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, FacilitatingBoycotts of Discriminatory
Organizationsthrough an Informed Association Statute, 87 Minn L Rev 481 (2002).
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stickiness1 of the default by imposing altering rules that vary
the necessary conditions for contracting around it.16 What I have
called "impeding altering rules" might be a particularly effective
way of maintaining a greater degree of individual autonomy
than traditional command-and-control mandatory rules.7 Indeed,
ex post the temporary restriction, a system of licenses with price
or quantity controls might be seen as a special kind of altering
rule that requires regulated entities to secure the license or
variance as the legally required procedure for opting out of the
presumed regulation.
The requisites for opting out might also be made by regulators
to turn on a collective choice of the regulated. One could imagine
that bars would be allowed to return to permitting smoking only
upon a plebiscite of a majority or supermajority of the bar owners.
I recently proposed that Yale Law School adopt a supermajority
transition rule of this kind with regard to a calendar experiment. The law school has, for about the last one hundred years,
had its fall semester exams in January. The experiment was to
see on a trial basis of a few years what it would be like to harmonize our calendar with the rest of the university and move
the exam period to December.18 The transition rule after the
trial would likely be especially important. Should the default be
that we return to our prior practice, or that we retain December
exams? I argued that to overcome status quo bias we should
require not just an affirmative faculty vote to retain December
exams, but also that two-thirds of faculty should favor the
change for it to continue.
GMM were wise to focus on clean theoretical examples of
temporary restrictions that extinguish choice with regard to the
regulated activity, followed by a period of uninhibited autonomy.
Their limiting case makes clear that a temporary restriction dislodging a preexisting equilibrium might have long-lived effects
even after the restriction expires.9 But having realized this possibility, lawmakers have additional ways to exploit the benefits of
temporary law. Most importantly, there is a tradeoff between
15 For a discussion of "sticky" default rules, see Ayers, 121 Yale L J at 2086-87
(cited in note 12).
16 See id at 2084 (cited in note 12).
17 Id.
18 See Lavinia Borzi, Law School Revamps Academic Calendar, Yale Daily News
(Jan 16, 2014), online at http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2014/01/16/law-school-revampsacademic-calendar (visited July 19, 2014).
19 See Ginsburg, Masur, and McAdams, 81 U Chi L Rev at 314 (cited in note 1).
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the deviations from laissez-faire that the law imposes during
and after the period for which the restriction is in effect. Lawmakers can soften the temporary restriction by reducing the
impositions on autonomy during the period of restriction and
might instead impose a firmer-than-laissez-faire regulation ex
post the restriction. The alternatives that I envision would still
move from a period of greater to a period of lesser restriction
and hence could still partake of the same kinds of benefits and
costs as GMM's limiting examples.
CONCLUSION

GMM have written a fine article that inventively theorizes a
new strategy-temporary law-for responding to a variety of
inefficiencies that may impact unregulated behaviors. By identifying and naming this strategy, the article allows the authors to
organize a variety of existing practices and to suggest other contexts in which temporary law might provide a net benefit. Their
model also reminds us of a crucial temporal limitation of paternalism (or what I prefer to call "parentalism"20). Children are
only temporarily subject to restrictions that limit their autonomy.
They literally age out of these legal restrictions. Many of the
temporary parenting restrictions have similar learning justifications. What's more, as I have suggested in this Essay, parents
utilize a range of methods that vary the harshness of the temporary restriction as well as the ex post transitions to greater
autonomy. 21 All in all, GMM have helped develop a device that
deserves its place in the behaviorally informed policymaker's
tool kit.

20 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 88 (1989).
21 For an extreme example, see generally Amy Chua, Battle Hymn of the Tiger
Mother (Penguin 2011).
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